Santa Cruz massacre

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The Santa Cruz massacre (also known as the Dili massacre) was the shooting of East Timorese pro-independence demonstrators in the Santa Cruz cemetery in the capital, Dili, on 12 November 1991, during the Indonesian occupation of East Timor.

Contents

Background

In October 1991 a delegation to East Timor consisting of members from the Portuguese Parliament and twelve journalists was planned during a visit from UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights on Torture, Pieter Kooijmans.[1] The Indonesian Government objected to the inclusion in the delegation of Jill Jolliffe, an Australian journalist whom it regarded as supportive of the Fretilin independence movement,[2][3] and Portugal subsequently canceled the delegation. The cancellation demoralised independence activists in East Timor, who had hoped to use the visit to raise the international profile of their cause.[4] Tensions between Indonesian authorities and East Timorese youths rose in the days after Portugal's cancellation. On 28 October, Indonesian troops had located a group of resistance members in Dili's Motael Church. A confrontation ensued between pro-integration activists and those in the church; when it was over, one man on each side was dead. Sebastião Gomes, a supporter of independence for East Timor, was taken out of the church and shot by Indonesian troops, and integration activist Afonso Henriques was stabbed and killed during the fight.[5]

A number of foreigners had come to East Timor to observe the Portuguese delegation, including independent US journalists Amy Goodman and Allan Nairn, and British cameraman Max Stahl. They attended a memorial service for Gomes on 12 November, during which several thousand men, women, and children walked from the Motael Church to the nearby Santa Cruz cemetery. Along the way, members of the group pulled out protest banners and East Timorese flags, chanted slogans, and taunted Indonesian soldiers and police officers.[6] Organizers of the protest maintained order during the protest; although it was loud, the crowd was peaceful and orderly, by most accounts.[7] It was the largest and most visible demonstration against the Indonesian occupation since 1975.[8]

The massacre

During a brief confrontation between Indonesian troops and protesters, Major Gerhan Lantara was stabbed.[9] Stahl claims Lantara had attacked a girl carrying the flag of East Timor, and FRETILIN activist Constâncio Pinto reports eyewitness accounts of beatings from Indonesian soldiers and police.[10][11] When the procession reached the cemetery, the leading section of the procession entered the cemetery while many continued their protests before the cemetery wall, waving flags and chanting pro-independence slogans. Indonesian troops had been standing by during this time, then a new group of 200 Indonesian soldiers appeared and began shooting.[12] Fleeing people ran through the main entrance and deeper into the cemetery and were pursued by the soldiers.

The massacre was witnessed by two American journalists—Amy Goodman and Allan Nairn (who were also attacked)—and caught on videotape by Max Stahl, who was filming undercover for Yorkshire Television. As Stahl filmed the massacre, Goodman and Nairn tried to "serve as a shield for the Timorese" by standing between them and the Indonesian soldiers. The soldiers began beating Goodman, and when Nairn moved to protect her, they beat him with their weapons, fracturing his skull.[13] The camera crew managed to smuggle the video footage to Australia. They gave it to Saskia Kouwenberg, a Dutch journalist to prevent it being seized and confiscated by Australian authorities, who subjected the camera crew to a strip-search when they arrived in Darwin, having been tipped off by Indonesia. The video footage was used in the First Tuesday documentary In Cold Blood: The Massacre of East Timor, shown on ITV in the UK in January 1992, as well as numerous other, more recent documentaries. Stahl's footage, combined with the testimony of Nairn and Goodman and others, caused outrage around the world.[14]

At least 250 East Timorese were killed in the massacre.[15] One of the dead was a New Zealander, Kamal Bamadhaj, a political science student and human rights activist based in Australia. Although Indonesian authorities described the incident as a spontaneous reaction to violence from the protesters or a "misunderstanding",[16] two factors cast doubt on their characterization. One was the documented history of mass violence committed by Indonesian troops in places such as Quelicai, Lacluta, and Kraras.[17] The other factor was a series of statements from politicians and officers in Indonesia, justifying the military's violence. Try Sutrisno, Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian forces, said two days after the massacre: "The army cannot be underestimated. Finally we had to shoot them. Delinquents like these agitators must be shot, and they will be...."[18]

Aftermath

In response to the massacre, activists around the world organized in solidarity with the East Timorese. Although a small network of individuals and groups had been working for human rights and self-determination in East Timor since the occupation began, their activity took on a new urgency after the 1991 massacre.[19] TAPOL, a British organization formed in 1973 to advocate for democracy in Indonesia, increased its work around East Timor. In the United States, the East Timor Action Network was founded and soon had chapters in ten cities around the country.[20] Other solidarity groups appeared in Portugal, Australia, Japan, Germany, Malaysia, Ireland, and Brazil.

The television pictures of the massacre were shown worldwide, causing the Indonesian government considerable embarrassment. The coverage was a vivid example of how growth of new media in Indonesia was making it increasingly difficult for the "New Order" to control information flow in and out of Indonesia, and that in the post-Cold War 1990s, the government was coming under increasing international scrutiny. Copies of the Santa Cruz footage were distributed back into Indonesia allowing more Indonesians to see the actions of their government uncensored.[21] A number of pro-democracy student groups and their magazines began to openly and critically discuss not just East Timor, but also the "New Order" and the broader history and future of Indonesia.[19][21][22]

The US Congress voted to cut off funding for IMET training of Indonesian military personnel. However, arms sales continued from the US to the Indonesian National Armed Forces.[23] President Clinton cut off all US military ties with the Indonesian military in 1999.[24]

The massacre prompted the Portuguese government to increase its diplomatic campaign. Portugal unsuccessfully tried to apply international pressure by raising the issue with its fellow European Union members in their dealings with Indonesia. However, other EU countries like the UK had close economic relations with Indonesia, including arms sales, and were reluctant to jeopardise these.[25]

In Australia, there was criticism of the federal government's recognition of Jakarta's sovereignty over East Timor. The government had been promoting increased ties with the Indonesian military at the time of the massacre, but in 1999 would cut off military ties in response to the violence after that year's independence referendum.[26] Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans, described the killings as 'an aberration, not an act of state policy'.

Commemorated as a public holiday in now independent East Timor, 12 November is remembered by the East Timorese as one of the bloodiest days in their history, one which drew international attention to their fight for independence.

See also

Notes

  1. ^ Krieger, p. 257.
  2. ^ Alatas, p. 53.
  3. ^ Hyland, Tom: "Jakarta 'sabotage Timor visit'", The Age, 28 October 1991. Read at Hamline University Apakabar Site. URL Accessed 26 August 2006.
  4. ^ Pinto, p. 183; Alatas, p. 57.
  5. ^ Singh, pp. 155–156; Pinto, pp. 183–184; Carey, p. 49; Alatas, p. 57. Alatas and Singh do not mention the presence of Indonesian troops at the church. Carey describes Henriques as "a Timorese member of a ninja (masked killer) unit which had broken into the Motael Church  ... to harass the sheltering students". Pinto describes him as "working for Indonesian intelligence".
  6. ^ Carey, p. 50; Jardine, p. 15; Alatas, p. 58.
  7. ^ Anderson, p. 146; Carey, p. 50; Singh, p. 157; Alatas, pp. 57–58; Amnesty (1991), p. 1. Alatas describes a peaceful procession "taken over by a small group of agitators", whose provocations included "the display of FRETILIN flags and banners" and "the shouting of anti-integration slogans".
  8. ^ Pinto and Jardine, p. 190.
  9. ^ Krieger, pp. 257–258.
  10. ^ Kubiak, W. David. "20 Years of Terror: Indonesia in Timor – An Angry Education with Max Stahl". Kyoto Journal. 28. Reprinted at The Forum of Democratic Leaders in the Asia-Pacific. Retrieved on 14 February 2008.
  11. ^ Pinto and Jardine, p. 191.
  12. ^ Carey, p. 50; Pinto and Jardine, p. 191; Anderson, pp. 149–150; Alatas, p. 58; Singh, pp. 157–159. Pinto insists that "there was no provocation", while Anderson discusses in detail the lack of orders to disperse or warning shots. Amnesty International (1991) confirms these claims via eyewitness testimony.
  13. ^ Goodman, Amy and Allan Nairn. "Massacre: The Story of East Timor". 1992. Excerpted at Democracy Now, 28 January 2008. Retrieved on 14 February 2008.
  14. ^ Jardine, pp. 16–17; Carey, pp. 52–53.
  15. ^ Carey, p. 51; Jardine, p. 16. The Portuguese solidarity group A Paz é Possível em Timor Leste compiled a careful survey of the massacre's victims, listing 271 killed, 278 wounded, and 270 "disappeared".
  16. ^ Brigadier General Warouw in Amnesty (1991), p. 4
  17. ^ Carey, p. 51.
  18. ^ Quoted in Carey, p. 52. A slightly different wording ("...and we will shoot them") is quoted in Jardine, p. 17.
  19. ^ a b Jardine, pp. 67–69.
  20. ^ "About ETAN". East Timor Action Network. Retrieved on 18 February 2008.
  21. ^ a b Vickers (2005), pp. 200-201
  22. ^ CIIR, pp. 62–63; Dunn, p. 311.
  23. ^ ETAN: U.S. Policy toward East Timor, East Timor and Indonesia Action Network.
  24. ^ ETAN Backgrounder for May 20 Independence, East Timor and Indonesia Action Network.
  25. ^ CAAT Publications - Arms to Indonesia Factsheet
  26. ^ "Australia should avoid ties with Indonesia military: Study". Reuters. Retrieved on August 16, 2007.

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